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Abstract
Mircrosimulation (MS) and Computable General Equilibrium models (CGE) have both been
widely used in policy analysis. Their combination allows the utilisation of the advantages of
both types. The aim of this paper is to describe the state-of-the-art in simulation analysis and
to illustrate the beneﬁts and problems of linking micro and macro models by analysing ﬂat tax
reform proposals for Germany. Taking feedback eﬀects into account has important implications
for the evaluation of tax reforms. The analysis shows that a personal income ﬂat tax can indeed
overcome the fundamental equity eﬃciency trade-oﬀ while simultaneously increasing the tax
revenue. However, this result does not hold for a ﬂat tax combining a personal income ﬂat tax
with a corporate cash ﬂow ﬂat tax, even when allowing for an ex-post loss in revenue as the
top of the distribution still gains the most.
JEL Codes: D58, H2, J22
Keywords: Microsimulation, CGE, linked micro macro models, ﬂat tax
∗IZA - Institute for the Study of Labor, P.O. Box 7240, 53072 Bonn, Germany, peichl@iza.org. I would
like to thank Christian Bergs, Stefan Boeters, Markus Clauss, Michael Feil, Clemens Fuest, Nicolas H´ erault,
Erling Holmøy, Thilo Schaefer, Sebastian Siegloch, Jorge Streb, an anonymous referee and seminar participants
in Bonn, Cologne, Leuven and N¨ urnberg as well as participants of the EcoMod conference in Berlin for their
helpful contributions. The usual disclaimer applies.I Introduction
The recent success of the ﬂat rate income tax in Eastern Europe suggests that this concept could
also be a model for countries of Western Europe. The introduction of a ﬂat tax system is widely
seen as a reform which may boost eﬃciency, employment and growth through simpliﬁcation
and higher incentives. However, inequality is expected to increase as a consequence of a ﬂat
tax reform. In the discussion of the ﬂat tax “a notable and troubling feature [...] is that it
has been marked more by rhetoric and assertion than by analysis and evidence“ (Keen et al.
(2008), p. 713). Given that ﬂat taxes have not yet been implemented in Western European
countries, the eﬀects of ﬂat tax reforms in these countries can only be studied on the basis of
simulation models. The method of simulation analysis aims at analysing and quantifying the
economic eﬀects of diﬀerent policies based on the given institutional background to compare
and evaluate diﬀerent reform proposals with respect to equity and eﬃciency eﬀects.
For the analysis of ﬁscal reforms, microsimulation (MS) and computable general equilibrium
(CGE) models have been widely used in the literature. CGE models consider various interde-
pendencies and facilitate simulating behavioural responses and adjustments on several markets.
In contrast, MS models consider only the household side of the economy, which allows for more
heterogeneity and a much more detailed mapping of the complex tax beneﬁt system. Combin-
ing these two model types enables the utilisation of the complementary advantages. The aim
of this paper is twofold. First, possibilities of linking microsimulation and CGE models are
shown. Second, the beneﬁts and problems of the linking approach are illustrated using a ﬂat
tax example for Germany.
The most popular ﬂat rate tax proposal is the ”Flat Tax“ of Hall and Rabushka (1985)
(HR), which combines cash ﬂow taxation on corporate incomes with the same single marginal
tax rate on labour income. This proposal, however, has not been implemented in its pure form
in any country yet. Previous reforms considered a ﬂat rate personal income tax as an indirect
progressive tax schedule with a basic allowance and a uniform marginal tax rate. In the lit-
erature, there are several simulation studies on eﬃciency and equity aspects of such (revenue
neutral) ﬂat income tax reforms. One focus of these studies is the impact on employment
and growth using CGE models (see, e.g., Heer and Trede (2003) for Germany or Jacobs et al.
(2007) for the Netherlands), whereas a second group of studies focuses on the distributional
eﬀects using MS models (see, e.g., Aaberge et al. (2000) for Italy, Norway and Sweden, Fuest
et al. (2008) for Germany and Paulus and Peichl (2008) for a cross country study of 10 EU
countries). In summary, all previous studies support the existence of a trade-oﬀ between eq-
uity and eﬃciency, i.e. it is not possible to decrease inequality while increasing employment.
However, a HR-type ﬂat tax may lead to further eﬃciency gains due to more investment and
labour demand as it is also likely to reduce tax distortions in the corporate sector. So far, the
1introduction of a HR-type ﬂat tax has been analysed using only CGE models. Stokey and Re-
belo (1995) conclude that a ﬂat tax reform would have little eﬀect on the growth rate. Dunbar
and Pogue (1998) show that high income households gain whereas low and especially middle
income households are burdened. These ﬁnding are supported by Ventura (1999) and Altig
et al. (2001). Cassou and Lansing (2004) ﬁnd that a ﬂat tax reduces growth in the short run
if revenue-neutrality is maintained, but increases capital accumulation and growth in the long
run. Nielsen et al. (1999) ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬃciency gains but negative distributional eﬀects for
a ﬂat tax in Denmark. So far, none of these studies has used a linked MS-CGE model to take
feedback eﬀects into account.
This paper contributes to the literature by analysing a HR-type ﬂat tax reform proposal
of the German tax system using a linked MS-CGE simulation model for the German tax and
transfer system. With its socio-economic and demographic structure, Germany can be seen
as a typical Western European democracy. Therefore, the qualitative results of our analysis
should be of interest to a wider range of countries.1 Applying the linked model to a not revenue
neutral ﬂat tax proposal shows that taking the general equilibrium eﬀects into account indeed
increases the expected eﬃciency gains in the long-run. The overall employment eﬀects are
larger than the labour supply reactions because of reduced costs of labour and capital resulting
in increasing labour and investment demand. As a consequence, a personal ﬂat income tax can
indeed improve the fundamental equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ. However, combining this ﬂat tax
with a cash ﬂow ﬂat tax on business income still increases inequality due to the large gains
at the top of the distribution. Therefore, we conclude that due their problematic short-term
distributional impact, ﬂat tax reforms are unlikely to spill over to the grown-up democracies of
Western Europe.
We proceed as follows. Section II describes methods to link MS and CGE models. Section
III describes the linked model used for the application. In section IV, the ﬂat tax reform
proposal for Germany is analysed. Section V concludes.
II Linking micro and macro simulation models
Before discussing possibilities to link micro and macro models, it is important to introduce
the main features of the stand-alone models. In general, simulation models are tools which
are designed to answer “what if” questions about diﬀerent policy reform options. In the run-
up of the implementation of a speciﬁc reform proposal, it is crucial to predict the expected
consequences on individuals (gains and losses, income distribution), the government budget
1It has to be taken into account, though, that the structures of the tax beneﬁt systems do vary considerably
among the countries of Western Europe.
2and key economic indicators (e.g. employment, prices, consumption) to provide policymakers
with well-founded decision guidance. The complexity of existing welfare states requires the
usage of simpliﬁed models for the evaluation of reform proposals. Theoretical models allow to
point out a single argument in a simpliﬁed framework and to construct hypotheses which can
be tested empirically. Empirical models allow for an econometric evaluation of a given reform
and are especially useful whenever the magnitude, and thus not only the sign, of the eﬀects are
to be estimated. If the reform already has been implemented (and data is available), an ex-post
analysis is possible using standard econometric procedures. On the other hand, if the reform
has not been implemented, only simulation models can provide information for an ex-ante
analysis of diﬀerent reform proposals. Other than in the natural sciences, it is seldom possible
in economics to construct natural experiments for the analysis of a given treatment (policy).
Policy simulations can be interpreted as quasi-experiments which allow the economist to ex-
ante analyse a reform proposal before its implementation in real life controlling for behavioural
responses of diﬀerent agents in the economy.
A Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models
General equilibrium theory has provided important insights about mechanisms that determine
the allocation of resources on mutually interdependent markets. CGE2 models compute numer-
ically the values of endogenous variables (e.g., prices, quantities) with the aim of quantifying
the impact of exogenous variables and policy measures (e.g., elasticities, tax rates) on economic
equilibria. Although CGE models are based on the microeconomic general equilibrium theory,
they usually use aggregated macro data for the analysis. The analysis focuses particularly on
the long-run3 allocation of factors and goods, whereas short-term distributional eﬀects cannot
be analysed in a sophisticated way using this type of models.
In a CGE framework, the interactions of individual households and ﬁrms on interdependent
markets are modelled. In a typical CGE model there are only a few representative agent groups,
while the number of ﬁrms (production sectors) is generally larger. A CGE model consists of a
set of equations describing the variables and a database consistent with these equations. For all
agents (households, ﬁrms, government) an optimising behaviour (e.g. utility and proﬁt maxi-
mization) is assumed to determine their behaviour on diﬀerent markets. In general, standard
models assume product and factor markets to be competitive and relative prices to be ﬂexible
2This class of numerical economic models is also called Applied General Equilibrium (AGE) models. A
Introduction to CGE models can be found, e.g., in Kehoe and Prescott (1995).
3It should be noted, though, that the term ”long-run” in the context of simulation analysis does not
necessarily imply a dynamic model. Even within the context of a comparative static model, two equilibrium
states of the economy are compared without taking into account the adaption path between them. Therefore,
the changes between the two equilibria have to be interpreted as ”long-run” eﬀects.
3enough to simultaneously clear all markets. However, it is possible to allow for non-market
clearing (e.g. unemployment or inventories), imperfect competition (e.g. monopolistic com-
petition), heterogeneous agents, and taxes or externalities (e.g. pollution). CGE models are
aimed at quantifying the impact of speciﬁc policies on the equilibrium allocation of resources
and relative prices of goods and factors. For the numerical computation of equilibria, it is
essential to specify functional forms of production and utility functions as well as the values of
the exogenous parameters of the model. The speciﬁcation of these functions and parameters is
of key importance for the model results. Usually some parameters are estimated (or estimates
are taken from the literature) and other parameters are calibrated to replicate the benchmark
equilibrium given in the data.
Comparative-static models are by far the most common class of CGE models. The econ-
omy is modelled at two given points in time only: the status quo benchmark and the future
counterfactual equilibrium. These models compare the diﬀerences (usually reported in per-
cent changes) between the benchmark equilibrium and the future equilibrium to which the
economy converges after a given exogenous shock. The transition path towards this new equi-
librium is not explicitly modelled. This, however, allows for a more detailed speciﬁcation of
the single-period economy in terms of numbers of agents, sectors and commodities. Dynamic
CGE models, by contrast, explicitly model the transition path. These models are far more
challenging to design, maintain and solve but allow a more realistic representation of the ad-
justment process of a policy change. However, the increasing complexity of dynamic models
often reduces the heterogeneity of the agents. Dynamic models assume rational expectations
of agents, i.e. they use all available information for the best guess of the future. This makes it
necessary to simultaneously solve for all periods.
B Microsimulation (MS) models
Microsimulation models are microanalytic partial equilibrium models focusing on one side (usu-
ally the household side) of markets.4 MS models are based on micro data which oﬀer great
ﬂexibility regarding the modelling of structural characteristics of micro units and a detailed
mapping of the complex tax beneﬁt system including non-convex budget sets. Therefore, MS
models reﬂect the considerable heterogeneity within the population by taking into account the
characteristics and circumstances of each individual.
Static MS models use cross-sectional data at a given point in time to mimic the tax law by
applying a set of (current or alternative) tax beneﬁt rules to individual units. These models
are essential arithmetic tax beneﬁt calculators that compute the budget set for every point of
4See, e.g., Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006) for a recent MS survey.
4the income distribution. This allows the user to simulate the instantaneous ﬁrst-round eﬀects
(in terms of ﬁscal and distributional eﬀects, i.e. gains and losses in diﬀerent variables at the
individual or aggregated level) of policy changes. They allow for a comparative-static analysis
of the pre- and post-reform state of the economy without looking at the adjustment process.
Dynamic MS models endogenously explain this process of adaptation through the incorporation
of dynamic ageing of individual records over time based on the probabilities of the happening
of diﬀerent real life events (e.g. marriage, divorce, birth of a child). The relevant life processes
are simulated and the individual characteristics are recalculated at each period in time which
allows moving the micro units forward through time. On the one hand, dynamic MS models
allow the modelling of demographic changes over time, but on the other hand, dynamic models
have a higher demand regarding the modelling, the data requirements and the computational
resources than static models. Therefore, often static models which are easier to build and
maintain are used in combination with a behavioural model.
Non-behavioural models5 do not allow the individuals to change their behaviour as a con-
sequence of a given policy reform. These models are used to estimate the immediate ﬁscal and
distributional eﬀects for ”the day after” the reform. This is done by generating income proﬁles
for various groups of individuals to highlight discontinuities in the tax beneﬁt rules which in
turn can be modiﬁed by policy-makers. Behavioural models simulate some kind of behavioural
response to a policy change. These responses can include the supply and demand of factors and
goods. The most common applications are models of labour supply. Microeconometric labour
supply models allow the modelling of both the extensive (participation) and the intensive (hours
worked) labour supply decision.
C Linking micro and macro models
CGE models excel through their theoretical foundation and the estimation of various interde-
pendent behavioural responses and adjustments on several markets. In contrast, MS models
are partial equilibrium models that do not consider the broader economic environment in which
the micro units are acting. Nevertheless, these models account for much greater heterogene-
ity than CGE models could ever do. In consequence, CGE models give no insight into how
aggregate changes in the economy aﬀect diﬀerent individuals as the distribution within repre-
sentative agent groups is assumed to be exogenous. During the last years, a tendency of linking
micro and macro models has emerged in computational economics to utilise the complementary
advantages of MS and CGE models. A linked model can provide a more powerful tool for pol-
5Note that behavioural responses can be simulated with both static and dynamic models. Sometimes
behavioural models are labelled dynamic. Although dynamic models often include behavioural responses, they
do not necessarily have to include them.
5icy analysis than using results from two stand-alone MS and CGE models (Anderson (1990)).
Outputs from the macro model can be used to align the predictions of the micro model and
to enable general equilibrium feedbacks and interactions among variables in the micro model.
Outputs from the micro model can be used to calibrate the macro model and provide a mi-
croeconomic basis for aggregate behaviour. Hence, the key advantage of a linked micro macro
model is the feedback which is used to resolve the model corresponding to a revised set of
parameters. This in turn will then enable to analyse the complex interdependence of various
policy measures with respect to ﬁscal, distributional, employment and growth eﬀects within
the same econometric framework. However, achieving these feedback eﬀects through linking
MS and CGE models is not a trivial task.
The idea of linking micro- and macroeconomic simulation models is almost as old as the
stand-alone models themselves. Orcutt (1967) suggests to link models operating at diﬀerent
levels of aggregation through intermediate variables. However, the number of researchers de-
veloping linked micro macro models is still very small worldwide (see Davies (2004)). Nonethe-
less, recent progress in information technology and advances in computational and econometric
methods are leading to a growing interest in combining these modelling techniques.
There are two general possibilities for linking the models. On the one hand, one can com-
pletely integrate both models into a joint model or on the other hand, one can combine two
separated models via interfaces (layered approach). The ﬁrst approach requires the complete
micro model to be included in the CGE model which demands high standards for the database
and the construction of the integrated model.
The layered approach can be diﬀerentiated into “top-down“ (see Figure 1, left-hand side),
“bottom-up“ (see Figure 1, right-hand side) or “top-down bottom-up“ (see Figure 2) ap-
proaches.6 The top-down approach computes the macroeconomic variables (price level, growth
rates) in a CGE model as input for the micro model which is adjusted to match an exogenous
macro aggregate. The bottom-up approach works the other way around and information from
the micro model (elasticities, tax rates) is used in the macro model (e.g. to calibrate the repre-
sentative agents). Both approaches suﬀer from the drawback that not all feedback is used. The
top-down bottom-up approach combines both methods to a recursive approach. In an iterative
process one model is solved, information is sent to the other model, which is solved and gives
feedback to the ﬁrst model. This iterative process continues until the two models converge.
Choosing the appropriate approach for the analysis of a given policy reform depends on
the speciﬁc research question. If one is interested in both micro and macro level variables and
the shock induces a complex feedback eﬀect which is quantitatively relevant, then a top-down
bottom-up model is the right choice. If not, it depends on the level of the initial shock. If
6Cf. Savard (2003) or B¨ ohringer and Rutherford (2006).
6Figure 1: Top-down and bottom-up
the shock occurs on a diﬀerent level than the variables one is interested in, either a top-down
or a bottom-up approach is suitable. If you are only interested in variables of the level where
the shock occurs, a stand-alone model - maybe with simple extensions (e.g. labour demand
constraints in a MS model or micro consistent aggregated elasticities in a CGE model) - can
do the job. Further on, in practical considerations, the availability of micro consistent data
(especially in developing countries) as well as time requirements and human resources have to
be taken into account. Fortunately, information technology is no longer the bottle-neck for
these kind of models.
To be able to successfully link MS and CGE models, common variables through which the
two models interact are needed. On the one hand, information from the MS model is aggregated
to calibrate the representative agent(s) of the CGE model. Typical variables and parameters
used in this bottom-up linkage include labour supply elasticities, income components, average
and marginal tax rates, consumption patterns, income levels and tax revenues. On the other
hand, information from the CGE model is given to the MS model. For the top-down linkage
changes of the wage or price level are used to adjust the (real) disposable incomes and con-
sumption levels for the labour supply estimations. When linking the two levels, it has to be
7Figure 2: Top-down bottom-up
assured that the individual functions from the micro model can be aggregated to macro level
functions and the macro level information disaggregated to the micro level in a consistent way.
For example, a (nested) multinominal logit speciﬁcation of the individual direct utility function
(which is usually used in discrete choice labour supply models) can be aggregated to a global
CES utility function (which is usually used in CGE models, see, e.g., Verboven (1996)). If the
top-down bottom-up approach is used, convergence criteria for the end of the iteration pro-
cess have to be deﬁned. Convergence is typically achieved when the changes in the exchange
variables are (close to) zero. However, there is no (theoretical) guarantee that both models
converge.
The application of linked micro macro models to analyse tax reforms is rather limited.7
Boeters et al. (2005) use the bottom-up approach to calibrate the three representative house-
holds of a CGE model to analyse diﬀerent hypothetical reform proposals of the social assistance
beneﬁt system in Germany. A similar approach is chosen by Fuest et al. (2007) to evaluate a tax
reform proposal for Germany with respect to ﬁscal, employment and growth eﬀects. Arntz et al.
(2008) use the recursive top-down bottom-up approach to analyse reform proposals designed to
7More applications exist for trade reforms in developing countries (see e.g. Davies (2004) for a survey).
8encourage labour supply at the lower end of the wage distribution in Germany. Aaberge et al.
(2007) use an integrated micro macro model of Norway to analyse the impact of population
ageing on ﬁscal sustainability with endogenous labour supply. Labour supply responses are
computed using the MS model and are then used in the CGE model to estimate changes in
wage rates. Rutherford et al. (2005) link a CGE model to the Russian Household Budget Sur-
vey (representing 55,000 households) in order to analyse the distributional eﬀects of Russia’s
WTO accession. They use the information of the micro model to calibrate the representative
agent of the CGE model and iterate both models until they converge in terms of price changes
and aggregate demand equalling aggregate supply.
D Potential problems of simulation analyses
When conducting a simulation analysis or interpreting its results one should be aware of po-
tential errors or biases (see Betson (1990)). Sampling errors can always occur when subsamples
from the whole population are used in an empirical analysis which can increase or decrease the
variation in the data. Thus, estimates from the simulation model might diﬀer from estimation
based on the whole population. If the sample was not drawn randomly, the assumptions of
statistical procedures might be violated and special corrections have to be used in the analysis.
Furthermore, there might be also “non-sampling errors“ in the dataset, resulting e.g. from non-
response and reporting or data processing mistakes. The weighting of the individual records
with population weights to estimate aggregated values for the whole population can reduce
these errors, as the weighting factors are chosen to ensure that the sample estimates conform
to macroeconomic indicators of the whole population. However, when these population factors
are modiﬁed, e.g. using static ageing techniques of reweighting, this can give rise to ageing
errors if the modiﬁcation itself is biased. Imputation errors arise when data from diﬀerent
sources are used for the imputation of missing values or variables. As a consequence, distribu-
tional assumptions might be violated leading to biased estimations. But not only the data is
error-prone but also the modelling of the benchmark or the counterfactual scenario itself gives
rise to potential mistakes. Individual response errors can arise from simplifying assumptions
regarding the individual behaviour in the model. Simplifying assumptions are always subject
to errors, but have to be used to overcome data limitations or to make the model operational.
Behavioural assumptions are necessary for the estimation of behavioural responses. To do so,
functional forms and co-variables of the econometric model have to be speciﬁed based on be-
liefs of the underlying behaviour of the individuals. Incomplete or imperfect beliefs can lead to
misspeciﬁcations and biased results. Environmental errors can e.g. arise from the negligence
of the broader economic environment or individual reactions to policy changes.
Further on, simulation models - as all models do - obviously rest upon strong simplifying
9assumptions about optimising behaviour, competitive markets and ﬂexible prices. CGE models
rely on the calibration method, which is to some extent rather arbitrary as it is not based on
a solid econometric foundation. However, the usefulness of a CGE model depends on the
aims and purposes it was designed for and what the alternatives are. If a model cannot be
solved analytically, a numerical solution can help to identify general equilibrium eﬀects of policy
changes and the role of (exogenous) parameters for the results can be explained using extensive
sensitivity analyses. Furthermore, even if the precise magnitude of the eﬀects remains uncertain,
it still might be possible to identify if the eﬀects are small or large or at least to compare and
rank diﬀerent scenarios.
When conducting a micro-macro linkage, several speciﬁc potential problems arise. The
main problem is the lack of theoretical and empirical consistency between the micro and the
macro parts which can give rise to (dis)aggregation errors. To be able to successfully link
MS and CGE models there have to be some common variables through which the two models
can exchange information. Usually, it is necessary to aggregate or disaggregate these variables
to be comparable with the variables in the other model. Of course, the less variables have
to be (dis)aggregated the more of the underlying heterogeneity in the data will be retained.
Furthermore, it has to be checked if the same variable in both models represents the same
population (e.g. household consumption in the micro model vs. aggregated total consumption
including government in the macro model). Functional forms (e.g. the preference functions in
the labour supply model and the aggregated utility in the CGE model) have to be speciﬁed in
a consistent way. In addition, it has to be checked if one run of each model represents the same
time horizon. However, despite the best eﬀorts, there is no guarantee of coherence between the
two models which can be complex and technically challenging to achieve.
When building and using a simulation model, a researcher has to be aware of these potential
errors and should try to avoid them if possible or at least to document the possible biases in the
analysis. Extensive sensitivity analyses should be conducted when building a model or simu-
lating a new scenario. When interpreting the results of a simulation study, one should consider
these potential errors and take a closer look at the underlying data, methods and assumptions.
Furthermore, estimations from simulation models should not be used as an exact forecast of
a single number but to compare and rank diﬀerent scenarios according to various dimensions.
Despite all these potential errors, simulation models nevertheless provide a powerful tool for
the ex-ante evaluation of ﬁscal policy reform proposals.
10III Database and model
A General layout of the simulation model FiFoSiM
Our analysis is based on a behavioural simulation model for the German tax and transfer system
(FiFoSiM) using income tax and household survey microdata. The approach of FiFoSiM is
innovative insofar as it creates a dual database using two micro data sets for Germany: FAST01
and GSOEP.8 FAST01 is a micro dataset from the German federal income tax statistics 2001
containing income tax data of nearly 3 million households in Germany. Our second data
source, the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), is a representative panel study of private
households in Germany. The simultaneous use of both databases allows for the imputation of
missing values or variables in the other dataset using techniques of statistical matching.
The layout of the tax beneﬁt module follows several steps: First, the database is updated
using the static ageing technique which allows controlling for changes in global structural vari-
ables (through reweighting of the sample) and a diﬀerentiated adjustment for diﬀerent income
components of the households (through uprating of various income components). Second, we
simulate the tax and beneﬁt system in 2008 using the uprated data. This allows us to compute
the disposable incomes for each person and household taking into account the detailed rules
of the complex tax beneﬁt system. The basic steps for the calculation of the personal income
tax under German tax law are as follows. The income of a taxpayer from diﬀerent sources
is allocated to the seven forms of income deﬁned in the German income tax law. For each
type of income, the tax law allows for certain speciﬁc income related expenses. Then, general
deductions like contributions to pension plans or charitable donations are taken into account
and subtracted from the sum of incomes, which gives taxable income as a result. Finally, the
income tax is calculated by applying the tax rate schedule to taxable income. To derive the
disposable income Y from gross income G, received beneﬁts (like unemployment beneﬁt, social
assistance, child beneﬁts, etc.) are added and taxes T and social insurance contributions S are
subtracted:
Y = G + B − T − S. (1)
Third, the individual results are multiplied by individual sample weights to extrapolate the
ﬁscal eﬀects of the reform with respect to the whole population.
8This section is based on the English documentation of FiFoSiM (see Peichl and Schaefer (2008)). In the
last years several tax beneﬁt microsimulation models for Germany have been developed. Most of these models
use either GSOEP or FAST data. FiFoSiM is so far the ﬁrst model to combine these two databases.
11B Labour supply module
Based on the disposable incomes, we estimate the labour supply eﬀects of tax reform scenarios.
For the econometric estimation of labour supply elasticities, we apply a structural discrete
choice household labour supply model. Discrete choice labour supply models allow to analyse
both the extensive (participation) and the intensive (hours worked) labour supply decision
within the same modelling framework (Blundell and MaCurdy (1999)).
Following Van Soest (1995), we assume that the household’s head and his partner jointly
maximise a household utility function in the arguments leisure of both partners and net income.
Household i (i = 1,...,N) can choose between a ﬁnite number (j = 1,...,J) of combinations
(yij,lmij,lfij), where yij is the net income, lmij the leisure of the husband and lfij the leisure
of the wife of household i in combination j. Based on our data, we choose ﬁve working time
categories for men and women (unemployed, employed, overtime and two part time categories).
We model a quadratic household utility function




with the arguments yij,lmij, and lfij, which enter the utility function in linear (coeﬃcients
β = (β1,β2,β3)
′) and in quadratic and gross terms (coeﬃcients A(3×3) = (aij)). We control for
observed heterogeneity in household preferences by adding interactions with control variables
into the speciﬁcation. Following McFadden (1973) and his concept of random utility max-
imisation, we add a stochastic error term εij for unobserved factors to the household utility
function:
Uij (xij) = Vij (xij) + εij. (3)
Assuming joint maximisation of the households utility function implies that household i
chooses category k if the utility index of category k exceeds the utility index of any other
category l ∈ {1,...,J}\{k}, if Uik > Uil. This discrete choice modelling of the labour supply
decision uses the probability of i to choose k relative to any other alternative l:






′xil) > εil − εik]. (4)
Assuming that εij are independently and identically distributed across all categories j to
a Gumbel (extreme value) distribution, the diﬀerence of the utility index between any two
categories follows a logistic distribution. This distributional assumption implies that the prob-
ability of choosing alternative k ∈ {1,...,J} for household i can be described by a conditional
12logit model which can be estimated using maximum likelihood:






The tax beneﬁt and labour supply modules of FiFoSiM only account for the household side
of the economy. The CGE module allows us to simulate the overall economic eﬀects of policy
changes including the production side. Therefore eﬀects on labour demand, employment and
GDP as well as wage and price levels can be assessed. The static CGE module of FiFoSiM
models a small open economy with 12 sectors and one representative household.9
The representative household maximises a nested CES utility function. At the top nest
the household chooses between aggregated consumption (including leisure) today Q or in the
future S. The result of this optimisation is the savings supply. On the second level, the present
consumption leisure (or labour leisure) decision takes place. The household maximises a CES












where β is the value share, and σC,F =
ρC,F−1
ρC,F the elasticity of substitution between consumption










K + T LS, (7)
where pC is the commodity price, w the gross wage, tl the tax rate on labour income, E
the time endowment, r the interest rate, tk tax rate on capital income and K the capital







K and the lump sum transfer T LS, that ensures revenue neutrality. Optimising (6)
subject to (7) yields the demand functions for goods and leisure. From the latter we calculate
the labour supply of the household. A representative ﬁrm produces a homogenous output in
each production sector according to a nested CES production function. At the top level nest,
aggregate value added (V A) is combined in ﬁxed proportions (Leontief production function)
with a material composite (M). M consists of intermediate inputs with ﬁxed coeﬃcients,
whereas V A consists of labour (L) and capital (K).10 The optimisation problem at the top
9The expressivenessof this simple CGE module as a stand-alone model is rather limited. In combination with
the state-of-the-art microsimulation module it becomes a powerful tool, though. Nevertheless, the improvement
of the CGE module is work in progress.
10The CGE module allows for sector-speciﬁc wages and capital costs (although the latter is rarely used)














In the bottom nest, the following CES function is used:
fi(Li,Ki) = [αiL
ρi







1−ρi is the constant elasticity of substitution between labour and capital.
To account for imperfections of the German labour market, a minimum wage wmin
i is mod-




i (1 −  ) ≥ L
D
i . (10)
The minimum wage is calibrated such that the benchmark represents the current unemployment
level of Germany. The government provides public goods (G), which are ﬁnanced by input taxes
on labour and capital tl and tk. A lump sum transfer T to the households completes the budget
equation:
G + T = t
lwL + t
krK. (11)
Domestically produced goods are transformed through a CET-function into speciﬁc goods
for the domestic and the export market, respectively. By the small-open-economy assumption,
export and import prices in foreign currency are not aﬀected by the behaviour of the domestic
economy. Analogously to the export side, we adopt the common Armington assumption of
product heterogeneity for the import side. A CES function characterises the choice between
imported and domestically produced varieties of the same good. The Armington good enters
intermediate and ﬁnal demand.
The model is based on a social accounting matrix (SAM) for Germany which is created
using the 2004 Input-Output-Table and the static ageing technique to transform the data to
2008. Further on, it is assured that this SAM is micro consistent by reconciling the data
with the household budget survey and calibrating the representative agent groups based on
this information. The elasticities for the utility and production functions are calibrated based
on empirical estimations. The sectoral Armington elasticities are based on Welsch (2001), the
elasticity of substitution between labour and capital is assumed to be 0.39 according to Chirinko
depending on the context of the simulated reform.
11It is possible to model diﬀerent minimum wages for each activity. Assuming involuntary unemployment
induced by a minimum wage is a rather strong assumption and might be to simple for the German labour
market and a model with wage bargaining (see e.g. B¨ ohringer et al. (2005)) might be more realistic. Therefore,
the predictions of the magnitude of the employment eﬀects should be interpreted carefully. However, for the
purpose of explaining possibilities of linking micro and macro models, this assumption should be suﬃcient.
14et al. (2004). The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is assumed to be 0.8 (Schmidt and
Straubhaar (1996)), whereas the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure is
based on aggregated labour supply elasticity estimates taken from the MS module.
D MS-CGE-Linkage
In FiFoSiM, the MS and CGE modules are linked in several ways. In the bottom-up linkage
the representative household (income, labour supply, tax payments) in the CGE module is
calibrated based on the simulation results of the microsimulation modules. For the top-down
linkage changes of the wage or price level are computed in the CGE model and used in the
microsimulation modules for the calculation of real disposable incomes and the labour supply
estimation. The top-down bottom-up approach used for this analysis is executed manually until
the changes in labour supply and wages close to zero, i.e. smaller than some ǫ. The MS module is
written in Stata and the CGE module in GAMS. The interfacing and the information exchange
has to be executed manually. We are currently implementing a routine to automatically execute
the GAMS program from Stata, read in the modiﬁed CGE parameters, resolve the MS model,
write the modiﬁed MS output in GAMS format, execute the CGE model and so on until
convergence is achieved. However, it appears to be useful to manually check the results to be
able to quickly identify possible problems.
IV A Flat Tax for Germany
A Cash ﬂow ﬂat tax proposal
The proposal of Mitschke (2004) in its original version combines an almost ﬂat rate tax (two
brackets with diﬀerent marginal rates) on earned income with a S-base cash ﬂow tax, i.e.
income which is invested in ﬁrms is tax exempt.12 Real investments are granted an immediate
write-oﬀ, whereas ﬁnancial investments are tax exempted. Therefore, the neutrality of the
savings and investment decision is achieved through this S-base cash ﬂow tax. In eﬀect, this
reform proposal is a switch from an income based tax system to consumption taxation (concept
of deferred taxation). In principle, this proposal is close to the ”Flat Tax“ idea of Hall and
Rabushka (1985) which combines a R-base cash ﬂow taxation on corporate income with the
same single marginal tax rate on labour income. The tax base is sales minus purchases with
capital goods being excluded (R-base).13 Essentially, the HR ﬂat tax is a consumption-type,
origin-based value added tax (VAT) with a tax credit for labour income (see Keen et al. (2008)).
12See Fuest et al. (2007) for a detailed description and analysis of the Mitschke proposal.
13See OECD (2007) for a review of the diﬀerent concepts of corporate cash ﬂow taxes.
15Further on, this origin-based VAT is a tax on domestic production that taxes exports but not
imports (in contrast to the destination-based form of VAT).
The Mitschke proposal includes several elements to broaden the tax base compared to the
current German tax law. Pensions as well as all payments from insurance contracts are now
subject to income tax. Several non labour income related deductions are abolished or limited
to lump-sum amounts. Further on, an imputed rent on owner-occupied housing is also taxed.
In contrast to Mitschke (2004), who chooses a progressive tax schedule with two brackets, we
model a single marginal tax rate of 25% for all types of income with a basic allowance of 7,500
Euro in this paper. The marginal rate of 25% is computed from micro data as an average tax
rate of taxpayers under the Mitschke proposal. The basic allowance is chosen such that the
Mitschke ﬂat tax yields the same revenue as the Mitschke two bracket schedule - allowing for
a loss in revenue compared to the existing system which is in line with the HR ﬂat tax idea.
Further on, the rather low marginal rate of 25% is in line with existing ﬂat tax rates (see,
e.g., Keen et al. (2008)). The Mitschke proposal further distinguishes between an introductory
phase (personal income tax reform, Scenario 1) and a ﬁnal phase (personal income tax and
cash ﬂow corporate tax, Scenario 2). In the ﬁrst phase, only the personal income tax system
is changed to a system with a single marginal rate on all sources of income (including capital
and business income). In the ﬁnal phase, the modiﬁed personal income tax is combined with a
cash ﬂow corporate income tax with the same marginal rate. In contrast to HR, the VAT is not
changed in the Mitschke proposal. Furthermore, the imputed rent on owner occupied housing
is also part of the tax base in this phase.
B Analysis
For a better illustration of results, the analysis is conducted in 4 steps. In the ﬁrst step, the
ﬁscal eﬀects are analysed using the static tax beneﬁt MS module without taking into account
the behavioural reactions of the economic agents (ﬁrst round eﬀects). In the second step, we
allow for behavioural reactions by estimating the labour supply responses without any feedback
to/from the CGE module (i.e. assuming exogenous labour demand). In the third step, the
labour demand and wage changes are computed in the CGE module (without any feedback
to/from the MS module, i.e. exogenous labour supply). In the fourth step, the linked model
is used for the computation of the overall employment and GDP eﬀects (general equilibrium)
and their feedback on the income distribution after all adjustments are taken into account.
We link the tax beneﬁt module to the CGE model by using the MS results to calibrate the
representative household in terms of income, labour supply and tax payments. Information on
changes in wages and prices are fed back from the CGE model to the MS model. This procedure
is iterated until the two models converge, i.e. the changes in labour supply and wages/prices
16are close to zero. The main results are summarised in Table 1.
When interpreting the results it has to be stressed that we are using static MS and CGE
models, i.e., the economy is modelled at two given points in time only: the status quo benchmark
and the future counterfactual equilibrium without modelling the adjustment process between
the two equilibria. The fact that we are using static models does not imply that we necessarily
compute short-run eﬀects. In contrary, the behavioural results present the (level) changes be-
tween two equilibria in the long-run without taking into account the transition path (which can
only be analysed in a dynamic model). Therefore, the behavioural adjustments are expectations
for the long-run (partial or general) equilibrium, i.e., after the economy has fully equilibrated,
whereas the ﬁrst round eﬀects represent the immediate short-run eﬀects the “day after” the
reform (without any adjustment).14
Model Round Eﬀect Scenario 1 Scenario 2
MS 1 Tax revenue -2 billion e -13 billion e
2 Labour supply +103,000 +251,000
CGE 3 Labour demand +370,000 +540,000
Link 4 Tax revenue after adj. +3 billion e -6 billion e
4 Employment +337,000 +471,000
4 Unemployment -0.9 p.p. - 1.3 p.p.
4 Welfare +1.3% +2.5%
4 GDP +1.1% +1.7%
Table 1: Summary of results
Source: own calculations based on FiFoSiM
The Mitschke proposal includes measures to broaden the tax base and a uniform marginal
tax rate instead of a graduated rate schedule. Therefore, it is a priori not clear cut if the tax
revenue will be higher or lower than in the status quo.15 The shift from the current German
tax regime to the Mitschke proposal would result in revenue losses amounting to e 2 billion
in the introductory phase (i.e. ﬂat personal income tax) respectively e 13 billion in the ﬁnal
phase (i.e. ﬂat personal income tax and cash ﬂow ﬂat corporate income tax) without taking the
behavioural responses into account (ﬁrst round eﬀects). These short-run eﬀects indicate that
the (not revenue neutral) ﬂat tax reform scenario reduces the average tax burden on labour.
14Note that if a simulation model computes short or long-run eﬀects depends on the closure rules. For
instance, if in a CGE model the capital stock/supply is assumed to be exogenous, the model will be able to
analyse short-term eﬀects. The results from a labour supply model are usually estimations for the long-run as
they do not account for frictions of the labour market, e.g. due to searching and matching or ﬁxed costs of
working. In the following, we use ”short-term” for the analysis without any feedback and ”long-term” for the
new equilibrium after all feedback has been taken into account.
15It would have been possible to construct the scenarios revenue neutral. However, the HR ﬂat tax idea as
well as the Mitschke proposal are not designed to be revenue neutral. Furthermore, allowing for a ﬁrst round
loss in revenue might trigger stronger eﬃciency eﬀects than a revenue neutral scenario. Therefore, the analysis
in this section allows for a loss (or increase) in tax revenue.
17As a consequence of this lower tax wedge, the net wage is likely to increase and the gross wage
is likely to decrease. These eﬀects imply increasing labour supply as well as increasing labour
demand due to reduced user costs of labour. These eﬀects will be simulated in the next steps.
In the second step, the labour supply eﬀects are simulated in the behavioural MS module
assuming exogenous labour demand and wages. Labour supply increases by 103,000 [251,000]
fulltime equivalents in Scenario 1 [2]. By including those second round eﬀects, revenue increases
and revenue losses are lowered. The distribution of the labour supply reactions with respect to
diﬀerent groups is presented in the upper panel of Table 2. First of all it should be noted that
all groups increase their labour supply in both scenarios. Nevertheless, the diﬀerences between
both scenarios for the diﬀerent groups are noteworthy. Women react stronger than men which
is in line with the recent empirical literature on female labour supply elasticities. One reason for
this eﬀect in the German context is the (implicit) abolition of joint taxation when introducing
a ﬂat tax. The existing German system of joint taxation makes it unattractive for secondary
earners to work as both spouses face the same eﬀective marginal tax rate. Therefore, in many
households only the husband is employed (often even working overtime) whereas the wife does
not work (or more precisely: specialises in household production). Lowering the statutory (and
eﬀective) marginal tax rates decreases the incentives for this type of employment distribution
within a given household. As a consequence, women increase their labour force participation
whereas men decrease it. The fact that even married men in total increase their labour supply
can be explained by the tax relief through the lower tax rates. If the scenario had been
constructed to be revenue neutral ex-ante, the labour supply eﬀects of married men would
have been close to zero (or even negative, see Fuest et al. (2008)). These eﬀects are robust to
parameter speciﬁcations in the sense that revenue neutral scenarios with higher tax parameter
values always yield lower labour supply eﬀects, whereas scenarios with higher tax reliefs yield
higher labour supply reactions. Therefore, the labour supply eﬀects in Scenario 2, which leads
to higher ﬁscal losses, are larger than those of Scenario 1.
Couple male Couple female Single male Single female Total
A: LS Scenario 1 27,208 39,607 1,950 34,706 103,471
Scenario 2 46,681 73,649 55,957 74,921 251,208
B: Emp. Scenario 1 79,754 118,753 30,238 108,900 337,645
Scenario 2 96,094 148,075 82,558 144,689 471,416
Table 2: Labour supply (A) and employment (B) eﬀects (fulltime equivalents)
Source: own calculations based on FiFoSiM
So far, these results are only based on the MS model. In the third step, the CGE model is
used to derive the eﬀects on labour demand, which increases by 370,000 [540,000] Scenario 1
[2] due to reduced costs of capital and labour. As labour supply is assumed to be exogenous in
18this step, the wages increase as a consequence.
In the fourth step, the linked model is used to integrate the micro (labour supply) and
macro (labour demand) analysis. The information from the MS model (step 1 and 2) is used to
calibrate the representative household of the CGE model and the feedback eﬀects on wages and
prices (step 3) are used again in the MS model. Both models are resolved several times until
they converge. This leads to the following results: employment increases by 337,000 full-time
jobs, unemployment is reduced by 0.9 p.p., and GDP increases by 1.1% in the ﬁrst scenario.
The distribution of these employment eﬀects across diﬀerent groups is presented in the lower
panel of Table 2 and is rather similar to the distribution of labour supply eﬀects explained
above. The overall employment eﬀects are larger than the labour supply reactions because of
reduced costs of labour and capital resulting in increasing labour and investment demand.16
However, the employment eﬀects are smaller than the pure labour demand eﬀect derived from
the stand-alone CGE model. These two result imply that the incidence of the tax reform is split
between employees (labour supply) and employers (labour demand). This result is conﬁrmed
by the average increase in the wages which is smaller than the reduction in the tax wedge. This
eﬀect indicates the importance of taking feedback eﬀects into account as the labour supply
model alone would underestimate the employment eﬀects whereas the labour demand model
would overestimate them. For the second scenario, we calculate a total of 471,000 new full-time
jobs (unemployment is reduced by 1.3 p.p.) and a 1.7% increase in GDP. These results show
that a cash ﬂow ﬂat tax leads to further eﬃciency gains due to more investment and labour
demand as a consequence of reduced tax distortions in the corporate sector.
What are the eﬀects on income distribution? We compute diﬀerent distributional measures
based on equivalised disposable incomes17 to analyse the distributional eﬀects before any (short
run) and after the complete (long run) adjustment process (see Table 3). Without taking any
behavioural responses into account (ﬁrst round eﬀects) the highest decile, which generates the
largest part of the overall tax payments, gains the most in both ﬂat tax scenarios. One should
note, though, that average gains of a decile do not, of course, exclude heterogeneity within
deciles. Households in the lowest deciles seldom pay taxes in the status quo and therefore the
relative changes are rather small. Overall, both scenarios lead to redistribution from middle
income households to the ’rich’, e.g., the middle income deciles ﬁnance the relief of the 10%
16These results are in line with results from Aaberge et al. (2007) who ﬁnd that the general equilibrium
eﬀects of a ﬂat income tax for Norway are larger than the pure labour supply reactions.
17We use the new OECD equivalence scale which weights the household head with a factor of 1, household
members over the age of 14 with 0.5, and under 14 with 0.3. The households net income is divided by the sum
of the individual weights of each member (=equivalence factor) to compute the equivalence weighted household
income. The results without equivalising household incomes do not diﬀer qualitatively. Further on, we do not
report the results of other summary measures of inequality, poverty or richness as they do not contribute any
new insights to the analysis.
19richest taxpayers. This result is reﬂected in an increase of the Gini coeﬃcient of disposable
incomes.18 The main reason is the relief for the top of the distribution. The small gains at
the lower end cannot compensate the higher burden in the middle income range and hence
inequality increases.
∆ Income without adj. ∆ Income with adj. Equivalent variation
Decile Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 1 Scenario 2
1 0.69 0.88 79.48 79.73 65 45
2 0.01 -0.33 12.42 12.05 -28 -163
3 -0.22 -1.82 6.20 4.35 -67 -454
4 -0.64 -2.53 3.16 1.41 90 -387
5 -1.33 -2.63 0.61 -0.59 282 -126
6 -1.92 -2.35 -0.55 -0.63 291 770
7 -2.30 -1.49 -2.13 -0.89 -516 596
8 -2.42 0.03 -3.19 -0.23 -251 3,323
9 -1.83 1.45 -2.63 1.88 -557 4,802
10 2.70 6.54 2.38 7.24 6,906 15,559
Gini / Sum 1.51 4.90 -2.38 1.73 6,215 23,965
Table 3: Change in disposable income (in percent) and equivalent variation (in million e)
Source: own calculations based on FiFoSiM
These eﬀects change, however, after the economy has fully equilibrated. Especially the
lowest deciles (using the same classiﬁcation as before any adjustments) gain above average in
relative terms in both scenarios. These high relative changes can be explained by low absolute
values for disposable incomes in these deciles, which consist mostly of transfers. If some of
these persons start working, they often earn a multiple of their previous income. This explains
the large changes in relative terms. Still, the highest decile gains most in absolute terms and
again middle income deciles are burdened the most. The introduction of the personal income
ﬂat tax reduces inequality because of the strong behavioural responses at the bottom of the
distribution. When combining the personal income ﬂat tax with the corporate cash-ﬂow tax,
however, inequality still increases but less than without behavioural adjustment. This is due
to the fact that especially the high income households have corporate or business income.
Analysing welfare measures is another important aspect for the evaluation of tax reforms.
In addition to looking at the changes in disposable income, we also report the eﬀects on utility
(after the adjustment process). We compute the changes in the equivalent variation as a
money metric welfare measure based on the microeconometrically estimated utility function of
18The Gini coeﬃcient of the distribution of tax payments (not shown in the table) is decreasing in both
scenarios indicating less redistribution through the income tax system. This prediction is conﬁrmed when looking
at more comprehensive measures of tax progressivity and redistribution which decrease for both scenarios.
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where Ei is the expenditure function, p the price (wage) vector, and Ui the utility level be-
fore (superscript 0) and after (1) the reform. The eﬀects on utility diﬀer from the eﬀects on
disposable income as they take into account the consumption-leisure decision which implies
an income and a substitution eﬀect. Therefore, increasing (decreasing) disposable income (i.e.
labour supply incentives) does not necessarily trigger higher (lower) labour supply. The dis-
tribution of utility gains and losses again indicate a redistribution from the poor and middle
income households to the rich. In total, when looking at the sum of these eﬃciency gains (im-
plicitly assuming an Utilitarian social welfare function with equal weights), the utility gains are
larger than the tax revenue losses. Therefore, it would be possible to compensate the people
who face lower utility as a consequence of the reform to increase the support for such a policy.
This gain in overall welfare is achieved because the reform reduces the labour leisure distortions
caused by the existing tax system.
To sum up, can a ﬂat tax reform improve the fundamental equity eﬃciency trade-oﬀ? Both
scenarios increase the eﬃciency of the tax system: labour supply, employment, GDP and welfare
increase both in the short and in the long run. However, equality decreases for both scenarios
in the short run and for scenario 2 in the long-run. The only case where eﬃciency and equity
both increase is the ﬁrst scenario after taking all feedback eﬀects into account. Therefore, a
ﬂat tax can improve the fundamental equity eﬃciency trade-oﬀ but this can be argued to be
the outcome of a speciﬁc ﬂat tax design rather than a universal feature of ﬂat taxes in general.
Note that the results of our analysis depend on the chosen ﬂat tax parameters (marginal
tax rate, basic allowance, tax base broadening, revenue). For instance, it would be possible to
construct revenue neutral scenarios. This would imply c.p. a higher (lower) marginal tax rate
(basic allowance). Further on, it would also be possible to keep the inequality level in terms of,
e.g., the Gini coeﬃcient unchanged. This would imply an even higher marginal tax rate.19 For
example, Fuest et al. (2008) simulate two scenarios that are revenue neutral for Germany. The
ﬂat tax with a low rate and the existing basic allowance (26.9% without tax base broadening)
increases the Gini coeﬃcient by 2% and labour supply by about 90,000 full time equivalents.
The ﬂat tax with a high basic allowance and tax rate (10,700e and 31.9%) keeps the Gini
coeﬃcient constant. However, in this scenario the labour supply eﬀects are not signiﬁcantly
19Due to lack of space, we do not present the results for such a scenario in detail but only discuss the main
implications. Further on, proponents of a HR-type ﬂat tax usually advocate a rather low marginal rate and
taking into account a loss in tax revenue. Therefore, the results presented in more detail are of special interest
as they diﬀer from previous ﬁndings in the literature and, hence, add additional insights.
21diﬀerent from zero. The welfare eﬀects (equivalent variation) are positive but roughly four
times smaller than in our Scenario 1. When analysing the scenarios from Fuest et al. (2008) in
the linked MS-CGE model, the employment eﬀects are estimated to be close to zero. This is
a consequence of the higher marginal tax rate and the almost constant labour supply. Positive
employment eﬀects can only be achieved in combination with a cash ﬂow tax on business
income. However, it is not possible to design a revenue and inequality neutral ﬂat tax reform
with the same marginal rate on corporate income without exceeding the previous user costs of
capital. This would then results in reduced labour demand and therefore in combination with
unchanged labour supply even in negative employment eﬀects.
V Concluding discussion
In this paper, we analysed the introduction of a comprehensive cash ﬂow ﬂat tax in the tradition
of Hall and Rabushka (1985) using a linked MS-CGE model of the German economy, which
provides a powerful tool for the ex-ante evaluation of hypothetical tax beneﬁt reform proposals.
Using the linked model enables us to extent the MS analysis beyond labour supply reactions by
accounting for the eﬀects on (un)employment and GDP. The CGE model can be supplemented
with a detailed distributive analysis. We ﬁnd that taking these feedback eﬀects into account
has important implications for the evaluation of (ﬂat) tax reforms.
Our analysis shows that the overall employment eﬀects are larger than the labour supply
reactions - because of reduced costs of labour and capital resulting in increasing labour and
investment demand - but smaller than the the pure CGE labour demand eﬀects because of
labour supply and wage adjustments. Therefore, it is essential to take these feedback eﬀects into
account. In doing so, the analysis shows that a personal income ﬂat tax can improve the familiar
equity eﬃciency trade-oﬀ, but only in the long-run. The adverse immediate distributional eﬀects
still dominate in the short-run. Moreover, combining this ﬂat tax with a cash ﬂow ﬂat tax on
business income with the same marginal rate still increases inequality - even when accounting
for feedback eﬀects - due to the large gains at the top of the distribution at the expense of the
middle class. This is important from a political economy perspective. A strong and politically
powerful middle class is a typical characteristic of most Western European countries. This
suggests that it will be hard for ﬂat tax reforms to spill over to these grown-up democracies.
Since our analysis focuses on Germany, the question arises whether the main ﬁndings are likely
to apply to other countries as well. Therefore, more (and especially comparative) country
studies are required to complete the picture. However, a multi-country linked MS-CGE model
has not been developed yet.
When interpreting the results, it has to be taken into account that we have limited our
22analysis to static models. Therefore, the eﬀects from our analysis only account for the new long-
run equilibrium neglecting the transition path.20 However, regarding the political feasibility of a
ﬂat tax reform, the short-term eﬀects are most likely to be decisive.21 An aspect neglected in our
analysis is the impact of tax reforms on training and human capital accumulation. The results
in Jacobs et al. (2007) suggest that ﬂat tax reforms may increase investment in skill formation
and thus change the composition of the labour force in the long term. But the question arises
whether the income tax is the best instrument to achieve this. Furthermore, our analysis
abstracts from eﬀects of the ﬂat tax reform on compliance. Flat rate tax systems are widely
expected to improve taxpayer compliance. The 2001 tax reform in Russia is widely thought
to be an example for this eﬀect. Indeed, tax compliance and revenue apparently improved by
about one third after the 2001 tax reform (Ivanova et al. (2005)). However, it is not clear
whether this can be attributed solely to the ﬂat tax or to improved law enforcement and tax
administration which was also part of the 2001 reform (see also Gorodnichenko et al. (2007)).
Moreover, the case of Eastern Europe diﬀers from Germany insofar as the latter has a long
tradition of income taxation in a market economy and a well established tax administration to
ensure tax compliance. In addition, since we do not change social insurance contributions, the
marginal tax rate on labour still remains high. This suggests that positive eﬀects of a ﬂat tax
reform on compliance are probably less important in Germany than in the transition countries
of Eastern Europe. Keen et al. (2008) survey the existing evidence of previous ﬂat tax reforms
in Eastern Europe. For the Russian case, they support the view that the increased compliance
cannot be attributed directly to the ﬂat tax reform. Besides Russia, only the 2004 reform in
Slovakia has been analysed and the results suggest that income tax revenues slightly declined
after the reform. For both cases, no evidence for increased labour supply could be found. This
evidence supports our ﬁndings that strong eﬃciency gains can only be achieved when allowing
for a loss in revenue (and an ex-ante increase in inequality).
Furthermore, the question arises whether the scope of increasing GDP and employment
through personal income tax reforms is suﬃciently large. Including the corporate income tax
in the analysis does indeed lead to larger eﬃciency eﬀects, but at the expense of increasing
inequality. Therefore, the main problem of implementing a ﬂat tax would be to convince a
majority of the population that an immediate redistribution in favour of the highest income
20Flat taxes are also supposed to have positive dynamic eﬃciency and growth eﬀects (see e.g. Stokey and
Rebelo (1995) or Cassou and Lansing (2004)).
21People tend to judge future gains and losses asymmetrically (see e.g. the “prospect theory“ by Kahneman
and Tversky (1979)). Starting from a reference point (status quo) and given the same variation in absolute
values, there is a bigger impact of losses than of gains (loss aversion). Furthermore, people prefer the status quo
over uncertain outcomes in the future (“status-quo-bias“, see Kahneman et al. (1991)). Therefore, short-term
losses in comparison to the status quo can have a much stronger impact than (possible) future gains. Hence,
the short term eﬀects presented here could be decisive.
23deciles is acceptable to achieve (uncertain) future eﬃciency gains. Moreover, it is uncertain
whether a tax system that abolishes a large number of exemptions and tax reliefs is politi-
cally sustainable. The temptation for politicians to serve special interest groups with special
deductions cannot be ignored. Furthermore, from a political economy perspective, a broad
tax base allows the government to increase revenue with small increases in tax rates (Brennan
and Buchanan (1980)). Therefore, narrow tax bases might protect the taxpayers from excess
taxation by the government.
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